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 Knowledges of the creative economy: 
Towards a relational geography of diffusion and adaptation in Asia 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent dialogues in geography and the social sciences have reminded researchers of 
the extent to which academic and policy knowledges are socially and spatially 
embedded – that is, they circulate through formal and informal systems of publishing, 
exchange, commodification and cultural influence. Academic and policy knowledges 
are, in short, very much a part of the creative economy. In light of this, our paper 
surveys knowledges of the creative economy itself, as reflected in a geography of 
industry reports and government policy statements in selected Asian countries. Using 
a post-positivist framework adapted from diffusion theory, we critically interpret the 
circulation, mutation and adaptation of knowledges of the creative economy, claims 
to its significance, areas of emphases and notable silences.  
 
Keywords: creative economy, academic knowledges, diffusion theory, policy 
discourses, relational geographies, Asia 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1988, David Harvey wrote in his foreword to Zukin's (1988: x) acclaimed book 
Loft Living that the artist, as one ‘representative’ of the cultural class, has always 
shared a position in the market system, whether as artisans or as ‘cultural producers 
working to the command of hegemonic class interest’. Indeed, the nexus between 
culture and economy and the role of cultural actors within economic systems is not 
new. What is notable, though, is the extent to which cultural activities have become 
key elements in the economic regeneration strategies of many countries. In the last 
two to three decades, and particularly in the United States and Western Europe, the 
cultural economy’s success has caused it to be hailed as a transformative component 
of total economic activities. Most often it is at the geographical scale of the city that 
the transformative cultural economy is imagined (Scott 2000). Recently, a normative 
policy script has emerged endorsing not only cultural economies but the newer, 
broader notion of creative economies. The script may be characterised as follows: to 
compete in the new creative economy, cities should seek to implement particular 
initiatives: encourage creative industry clusters, incubate learning and knowledge 
economies, maximize networks with other successful places and companies, value 
and reward innovation, and aggressively campaign to attract the ‘creative class’ as 
residents (Gibson and Kong, 2005). Beyond the city, policies promoting growth of 
the creative economy as a competitive strategy are emerging at various scales and in 
increasingly diverse places – from municipalities to national and even multilateral 
trading regions (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2005). 
 
At the same time, global economic changes have enabled more rapid and penetrating 
flows of ideas about creative economies, influenced by the shifting geopolitics of 
production and business organisation. Changes in media, new communications 
technologies and increased traffic in ‘experts’ via consultancy work, conferencing, 
and international contracting have contributed to the pervasiveness of policy 
discourse about creative economies (Gibson and Klocker 2004). Yet, the creative 
economy has also gained a level of importance because at the same time the very 
tradability of knowledge and services has been advanced. Prior to the digital era, the 
domain of ‘culture’ was largely insulated from phases of industrial globalisation 
when thought of as ‘national culture ‘ (as is evident in cases we discuss below). The 
 semantic turn in policy to ‘creative economy’ and ‘cultural industries’ has changed 
this, and often replaced policy directed at maintaining the arts sector (within the 
nation) in favour of strategies to reorientate culture to export markets, enterprise 
dynamics and skilled business in-migration.  
 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, creative economy strategies thus became attractive in 
several cities in Asia, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei and Seoul – important 
regional cities with already established national broadcasting, arts and cultural 
industries, but with aspirations for ‘world city’ status. Given the dynamic changes 
occurring in Asia, and the different economic situations in which specific Asian 
countries function, this paper seeks to survey government policies in selected Asian 
countries and examine the diffusion and circulation of knowledges of the creative 
economy, areas of emphases and notable silences. The recent popularity and 
proliferation of creative economy discourses amongst academics and policy makers 
leads us to our central concern: to track the extent to which the largely western 
discourses of creative economy are adapted for and in selected Asian contexts by 
policy makers, and to comment on the appropriateness of such circulated knowledge 
in the context of each country’s own national visions and goals.  To borrow Jing 
Wang’s (2004: 9) question with reference to the ‘global reach’ of creative economy 
discourse: ‘How far can ‘creative industries’ travel?’ To address these issues, we have 
chosen to focus on the following countries: Japan, as the former Asian powerhouse; 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan as the four Asian tigers; and China 
and India, as rapidly rising economies with huge potential.   
 
CONTEXT AND APPROACH 
 
Despite the growing importance given to the creative economy by governments and 
policy-makers in the Asia-Pacific, geographies of knowledge on creative economy 
are still highly skewed towards the experiences of Europe and North America.  Much 
of the frontier research has been on major metropolitan areas in those two continents 
(e.g. Los Angeles, Manchester and Paris; see for example Scott, 2000; 2002; Florida, 
2002). Although work is starting to emerge that discusses the contours of the Asian 
creative economy (e.g. Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2005), the overwhelming picture 
(certainly in academic research) is a geography of European and North American 
 creative cities and industries. This flies in the face not only of the substantial urban 
and cultural policy foci in several Asian cities, but of the rise in production and 
consumption of Asian cultural products, evidenced in the emergence and size of 
creative industries such as Bollywood, the Hong Kong and Korean film industries, 
Cantopop and Mandarin pop, Japanese manga and anime productions, the animation 
and digital media industry, and so on. The Euro-American focus of academic 
knowledges on creative economies also fails to capture how inter-regional dynamics 
and flows might shape policies and industries. In Asia, rivalries between states, 
linguistic connections and differences and the geopolitical relationships forged with 
and between powerhouses like China and Japan all inflect flows of investments and 
ideas. 
 
The nascent dissemination of discourses of creative economy in Asia provides a 
timely and important opportunity to explore the extent to which flows of knowledges 
are becoming increasingly transnational – though in ‘lumpy’ and uneven ways. Our 
approach thus has some link to a long tradition of diffusion theory in geography – one 
reflected in the various epistemological twists and turns of the discipline. Diffusion 
theory stemmed originally from Sauerian cultural geography and its ‘reconstruction 
of diffusion pathways’ for agricultural practices, crafts and ideas (see Sauer, 1952), 
but found particular favour in the quantitative modelling phase of the 1960s (most 
notably influenced by Hägerstrand’s model of interaction matrices, innovation waves 
and adoption surfaces – see Hägerstrand, 1968; Leighly, 1954), that sought to reveal 
underlying spatial patterns in the diffusions of innovations. Such ‘classical’ 
approaches emphasised positivist interpretation of observed spatial distributions and 
the development of mathematical models and simulation techniques that could prove 
useful in predicting, for instance, the spread of contagious diseases. 
 
At one level, as described above, Asia has been marginal to the geography of creative 
economy discourses (with its origins in the English-speaking west), lagging behind 
academic and policy debates in the North Atlantic, and rarely contributing key ideas 
or theorists. A classic diffusion model could be applied in order to trace how a 
particular assemblage of ideas (in this case of the creative economy) radiates out from 
centres of production elsewhere, eventually reaching Asian locations in turn. This 
geography is one where proximity and physical distance still matter in explaining the 
 spreading popularity of ideas, despite the advent of new information and 
telecommunications technologies that were meant to overcome ‘frictions of distance’ 
and produce an immediacy in information flow through new technological-economic 
networks (Castells, 1989). Evidence would come in the form of the presence or 
absence of creative economy strategies in numerous countries (and their primary 
cities), literally mapped in Cartesian space.  
 
However, rather than apply a diffusion framework in ways that may simplistically 
depict Asian cities as positioned in a linear geography of marginality and distance, we 
have another agenda: to trace the uneven and particular ways in which different Asian 
locations have absorbed and mutated creative economy discourse in their official 
policies and economic development strategies. Later post-positivist critiques of 
diffusion theory sought to situate diffusion politically, and understand ‘the selective 
social processes through which information flows are differentially constituted as 
socially meaningful’ (Gregory, 2000: 176; see also Agnew, 1979; Blaut, 1977; Yapa 
and Mayfield, 1978). Our approach is nested broadly within this latter phase of 
diffusion studies. Although a classical diffusion model of the spread of ideas has a 
straightforward methodology and common-sense explanatory appeal, it does not 
account for the quite different sorts of engagement with ideas of creative economy 
displayed in Asia, nor does it explain how via the circulation and mutation of creative 
economy discourses, credibility is accorded to the output of Northern thinkers (cf. 
Yeung, 2002; Gibson and Klocker 2004), as their ideas move through international 
circuits of publishing, conferencing and policy debate. Asian commentators, 
academics and policy-makers interested in creative economies are in certain moments 
both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in relation to Euro-American knowledges: insiders in 
the sense of being participants in internationally networked industries, or as 
academics contributing to English-speaking debates; but outsiders because much of 
the policy work must be conducted at some distance from the places where ideas were 
formulated, and in a range of languages other than those of major international 
thinkers in the field. Dissemination and mutation of creative economy discourse in 
Asia thus inevitably requires some sense of translation – both in a symbolic and 
literal sense.  
 
 This translation occurs in a number of ways: through the movements of ‘experts’, the 
contracting of international consultants, distribution of popular books (such as those 
by Florida and Landry), internet-searching and electronic publishing, and via official 
multilateral policy-making forums. The latter include the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), which has emphasised the economic importance of culture in its recent 
efforts to standardise and enforce intellectual property laws in Asia; the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Forum (APEC), which since 2002 has been instrumental; UNESCO (see 
discussion below) and monetary organisations such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, all of which tend 
to advance generalising prescriptions for economic change (often as a condition of 
aid). In these instances diffusion of ideas about creative segments of the economy 
may also be bound up in the globalisation of norms and the wider politics of trade 
liberalisation. 
 
In light of the multiple paths to diffusion, we also wish to remain attuned to the 
possibility that non-adoption of innovations (in this case, western concepts of creative 
economy) may not constitute a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of engagement with new ideas – an 
inference that can often be mistakenly drawn from the application of classical 
diffusion models based on only observed spatial phenomena. As Yapa (1977) argued, 
‘non-diffusion is not to be equated with the passive state of lack of adoption due to 
low levels of awareness or apathy’. Examples of non-adoption require situating in 
specific social, cultural and economic contexts. We thus wish to trace the 
dissemination and adaptation of creative economy discourse, alert to the nuanced 
ways in which ideas travel, become popular, and are mutated to suit local 
circumstances – or indeed are not absorbed. Of utmost importance are considerations 
of the ways in which the domestic issues and tensions establish the setting for policy 
debates, and the appropriateness or otherwise of the resulting policy prescriptions, in 
light of the socio-economic circumstances of each national or metropolitan 
population.  
 
The approach adopted here thus builds the first steps towards a relational geography 
of the diffusion of creative economy discourse. It documents in a descriptive, rather 
than statistical fashion, what ideas have flowed, and how, throughout Asia, and then 
maps out the contexts for innovation, mutation or non-adoption. What matters more 
 than strict spatial dissemination is how various governments, industries, actors and 
ideas are entwined (or not), relate to each other (or not) and create webs of linkages 
through which concepts travel and are translated. Ultimately, then, our attempt is to 
think through how diffusion may be re-theorised in light of recent developments in 
actor-network theory and relational geography. Diffusion spaces are not ‘blank’ or 
‘even’, but rather inherited and mutable – already shaped by local and national 
politics, international relations, and the presence and particular geographies of formal 
and informal communications networks. Diffusion spaces are thus constantly made 
and re-made through always evolving sets of linkages and flows between actors, 
institutions and industries. It is hoped that subsequent ethnographic research that is 
intended to follow this work will further flesh out the detail and complexity of how 
various actors – particularly academics and policy-makers – embody new ideas and 
act upon them in their professional lives within such networks. 
 
A note on method 
 
For present purposes, we began by searching for policy documents by national 
governments, and policy statements, including key speeches by government leaders, 
that had any mention of ideas such as ‘creative economy/industry’, ‘cultural 
economy/industry’, ‘culture’, and ‘the arts’.  The emphasis was on national-level 
policy1 rather than policy at any other sub-national level (e.g. prefectural, county).  
Analysis focused on identifying (a) what the key ideas and concepts underlying 
policy were for each country, the origins of these ideas, and their evolution; (b) the 
key sectors emphasised (or absent) in each country, how they relate to their existing 
economies, and shifts over time, if any; (c) dominant narratives in each country, and 
any shifts over time; (d) key authors and ‘models’ that policies draw from, what ideas 
of those authors and models are emphasised, how holistic an understanding of these 
authors and models there is, and how critical an approach to these authors and models 
is evident; (e) mutations of global (‘western’) discourses, if any, in these countries’ 
national policies, how and why.  Where relevant and important, material produced by 
private businesses and consultancies in these countries was also analysed for 
comparison with national policies. We have presented the evidence gathered here in a 
                                                 
1 While Hong Kong is part of China, it is treated independently from China here, since it is a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR).   
 logical progression based on our findings – from those countries that have most 
aggressively adopted creative economy discourse, through those that have diverged 
from its ‘normative’ scripts in certain ways, through to countries with non-adoption. 
This structure has been used in order to foreground discussions of the contexts of 
diffusion and adoption/non-adoption. 
 
TRAVELLING DISCOURSE: ASIAN ‘TIGERS’ AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
NORMATIVE ‘SCRIPTS’ 
 
As Table 1 summarises, the most active engagement with the ideas of 
cultural/creative industries and economies amongst the countries studied was by the 
four Asian tigers, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan; each with 
numerous policy documents that outline their government’s respective vision and 
strategies.  By comparison, the normative discourse is markedly absent in India and 
divergent in Japan, while adopting similar terminologies is in substance quite 
different in China. In this section, we examine how the largely western discourse has 
internationalized through its emergence in four key Asian economies. We note, 
however, that knowledges of the creative economy, even when enthusiastically 
circulated, are not imported in identical ways, with different nuances and areas of 
emphases, and select silences.   
 
Singapore 
 
Through Singapore, evidence emerges clearly that the discourse about 
creative/cultural industries has travelled to Asia extensively and in impacting ways. 
The city-state’s government agencies have enthusiastically adopted a range of related 
ideas (creative/cultural industries, creative manpower, creative workforce, creative 
clusters, creative town, cultural capital). They have also carefully distinguished 
between similar but non-identical concepts. In particular, government documents use 
the term ‘creative industries’ to refer to a larger, more embracing category than 
‘cultural industries’, and reserve ‘copyright industries’ to include both the creative 
industries and associated distribution industries (ESS, 2003: 52). These distinctions 
draw from diverse origins – the ‘creative’ characterization from the U.K. (Creative 
Industries Mapping Document, 2001), the ‘copyright’ categorization from the U.S. 
 (Siwek, 2002), and the ‘cultural’ classification from Australia (Cunningham and 
Hartley, 2001). This markedly underscores the effect of travelling discourses, and the 
appropriateness of the crossroads metaphor in describing Singapore in the ideas 
marketplace. 
 
In all four economies which have engaged actively with the creative economy 
discourse, the burst of attention to the creative/cultural economy came about in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, though in the case of Singapore, early pronouncements  
reveal governmental recognition of the economic potential of the arts dating to the 
early 1990s. Then Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, was most 
active among Ministers in publicly suggesting that ‘to be competitive in the next 
phase of our national development, we need to promote the arts’ (Yeo, 1991: 56) and 
that while Singapore had been ‘an international market for rubber, for spices, for oil, 
for Asian Currency Units, for gold futures, and for many other things’, it also hoped 
to be ‘an international market for the arts’ (Yeo, 1993: 66).  Indeed, as part of the 
promotional strategy, in 1990, the Economic Development Board (EDB) set up a 
Creative Services Strategic Business Unit, later renamed the Creative Business 
Programme, to ‘develop Singapore into a centre of excellence for the various creative 
industries’ (EDB, 1992: 2). In 1991, it developed a Creative Services Development 
Plan as the blueprint for the development of the four major sectors, defined as film 
and music, media, design, and arts and entertainment (EDB Press Release, 10 
December 1991). These nascent policy engagements coincided with the earlier 
academic work on creative economies emanating from Europe (see Bianchini, 1993a; 
1993b; Driver and Gillespie, 1993), and contradict the depiction of a simple classical 
diffusion geography of creative economy discourse discussed above. Rather than 
Asian places lagging behind in the flow of ideas, discourses of creativity as economic 
policy were adopted quickly in Singapore, and with a relatively straightforward 
translation from its European origins, in a first, early phase of their global distribution 
(though admittedly this was in one of Asia’s most prominent, international English-
speaking cities).  But there seems to have been a hiatus, and it was not until year 2000 
that a further push was made in the form of the Renaissance City Report (MICA RCC, 
2000), followed by a green paper by the then Ministry of Information and the Arts 
(now Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts – MICA) titled Investing 
 in Singapore’s Cultural Capital (MITA, 2002) and a Creative Industries 
Development Strategy by the Economic Review Committee (ERC, 2002). 
 
Singapore’s thoroughness in examining discourse and practice elsewhere as a way of 
charting its own directions is characteristic of this city-state. Its several policy 
documents and blueprints expose a detailed knowledge of other experiences, and a 
willingness to adopt circulating discourses about creative economies. This is evident 
in the many references to policy and research documents from different parts of the 
world, from the British Council, UK Trade and Investment, UK Department of 
Culture, Media and Sports, Australia’s Creative Nation strategic plan, New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise, Hong Kong Trade Development Council, and many others. 
There are also innumerable references to national policies and the desired vibrancy 
evident in other countries, including the U.K., Ireland, Finland, Spain, Denmark, 
Hong Kong and South Korea, for overall policy but also specific industry policy (e.g. 
design policy). Singapore’s aspirations are to emulate cities judged to wear the label 
of ‘creative’, in particular, New York and London, though a more realistic target 
within the medium term is also set in policy documents, to rival Hong Kong, Glasgow 
and Melbourne.  In any case, the driving motivation is to become a “hub” for creative 
activity, not unlike its desire to be a hub in several other areas, such as tourism, 
conventions, medicine, and education. 
 
To develop the creative industries, policy makers do not hesitate to reference 
circulating discourses, particularly by ‘popular’ academic authors like Richard 
Florida and John Howkins. Engagement with these discourses is, however, not 
especially profound, lingering mainly at the level of offering justification rather than 
deep engagement with specific ideas. Thus, Florida is cited to justify why Singapore 
must harness the creativity of its people to develop a creative manpower for 
competitive advantage (ERC Services Subcommittee Report 2002: 1; ESS 2003: 61).  
The ERC Report (2002: 1), for example, refers to Florida’s notion of multi-
dimensional creativity, taking the form of ‘technological creativity (innovation), 
economic creativity (entrepreneurship), artistic and cultural creativity’, and thereby 
adopts the idea that Singapore needs to ‘embark on a journey of reinvention to look 
into how we can harness the multi-dimensional creativity of our people’ in order to 
establish a ‘new competitive advantage’.  Similarly, quoting Howkins (2001), it is 
 recognized that ‘(creativity) flourishes most when and where they are rewarded…The 
most marked growth is not actually in the creation of new products, but in their 
exploitation, distribution and trade’ (ESS 2003: 61).  Hence, a lesson is drawn and a 
case made for maintaining a robust ‘institutional framework … to protect creative 
property, while enabling it to be exploited, distributed and traded efficiently’ (ESS 
2003: 61).  All of these specific lessons drawn from travelling discourses contribute 
to the more general narratives that permeate policy documents, of which four strands 
are key: (1) creativity as trigger for economic development, (2) creative economy as a 
means of enhancing human capital through creative thinking and problem solving, (3) 
related to this, that creativity is present across a whole range of industries and not just 
within arts and culture, and (4) creativity and culture as a means to place competition, 
improving the quality of life to attract foreign talent, thus enhancing the national 
competitiveness of the country. Together, these narrative strands contribute to the 
total vision of Singapore as a ‘world city’, a ‘global arts city’ and a ‘Renaissance 
city’.   
 
However, despite obvious influence, not all aspects of ‘western’ discourse travel 
unexpurgated. Notions of geographical clustering of creative activities and cultural 
capital have mutated in the context of Singapore. Whereas agglomeration and cluster 
theory hold much persuasive sway (but also have some detractors) in the academic 
literature (see Coe and Johns 2004), and spatial clustering and physical proximity 
constitute specific dimensions of urban and cultural policy in many cities elsewhere 
(e.g. Manchester, Sheffield, Dublin, Adelaide), the notion of a ‘creative cluster’ in the 
context of Singapore is non-spatial, or at best, aspatial. Instead, the ‘creative cluster’ 
has become the defining nomenclature for an industrial sector, comprising industries 
within the fields of ‘arts and culture’, ‘design’ and ‘media’ (see Table 2 for the 
specific industries). The idea of a geographical cluster is, however, not completely 
jettisoned. Instead, it appears in the concept of a ‘creative town’, where it is 
recommended that a selected township be developed as a ‘vibrant, creative, culturally 
rich, entrepreneurial, and technologically savvy community’ that will 
 
unleash the latent creativity and passion in each individual; integrate 
arts, culture, business, design, and technology into community 
planning and revitalization efforts; enhance the ideas-generating 
 capacity and entrepreneurship qualities of the community; increase 
cultural awareness among people; and promote community bonding, 
local pride and participation through arts and cultural events, and the 
employment of the newest infocomm and media technologies (ERC 
Services Subcommittee Report, 2002: 17).   
 
Here is evidence of another key narrative strand in Singapore’s policy discourse – 
that of creativity and culture as part of social and community development. This is a 
strand of the narrative that quite consistently emerges in Singapore, as a reminder that 
the economic agenda must be balanced with social and political goals, as expressed in 
the Renaissance City Report, which does not forget the role of culture and the arts:  
 
[They] are mirrors to the cultural, historical and socio-political life of 
Singaporeans. As forms of social commentary, they provide an avenue 
for Singaporeans to critique, analyse and discuss their experiences in 
an accessible and creative manner, thereby encouraging the 
development of views and positions on issues. This will be a society 
that is clear about its identity, confident and at ease with itself (MICA 
RCC, 2000: 39). 
 
This narrative is not at odds with earlier discourses on culture-led regeneration, 
bearing in mind the works of Bianchini (1993a) and Wynne (1992), for example.  
However, it should be noted that these earlier academic insights have not constituted 
part of the circulating discourses reaching policymakers in the same way that more 
recent high profile ‘popular’ academic books by Florida and Landry have.  
Nevertheless, Singapore’s plans reflect in part Bianchini’s (1993b: 212) view that, to 
be truly effective, cultural policies should not be measured purely by income or 
employment generated but should contribute towards improvement in the quality of 
life, social cohesion and community development. Cultural policy, he argues, should 
contribute to the development of cities as ‘cultural entities - as places where people 
meet, talk, share ideas and desires, and where identities and lifestyles are formed’.  In 
that way, the arts can become a part of people’s daily lives, socially and 
economically. Only then can the arts be a part of the wider community rather than an 
appendage to it (Wynne, 1992: x). What these authors do not emphasise, and which 
 Singaporean policy makers are at pains to illustrate, is the cultural contribution to 
nation-building. 
 
While it is early days yet to comment on successes or failures, one critical 
strand that has emerged in public discourse is the concern that over-emphasis 
on the economic value of creativity may itself stymie the nurturing of local 
creativity.  Critics have argued that Singapore may become a kind of 
emporium for creative products rather than a hearth for the development of 
local idioms (Kong, 2000).  This is detrimental, not only to the economic 
value of the creative industries (for why would Singapore be special if all it 
did was to be a successful trader in others’ creative products), but also to the 
social and political agendas of the nation (for wherein lies the potential for 
community construction and identity building if local voices do not mature). 
 
From the perspective of a relational geography though, the case of Singapore 
provides an excellent example of the adoption of specific ideas as well as more 
general narrative strands from circulating discourses. It also illustrates how 
internationalizing discourses do travel effectively, but are inflected by place-specific 
geographies, in this case, of a young state barely 40 years in the making, concerned to 
keep a social and national narrative alive along with a creative economy agenda.   
  
Hong Kong 
 
In late 1998, then Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa acknowledged the importance of 
the arts to Hong Kong’s future in his policy address. Following that, a number of 
reports and policy documents were produced on the creative industries (the term most 
commonly used) in Hong Kong, testimony to the government’s desire to exploit this 
potential further (HKADC, 2000; HK TDC, 2001, 2002; HKDOT, 2002; HKDSCI, 
2002; HKGCC, 2003). This was reinforced again in 2003 in Tung’s policy address 
when he said that ‘creative industries are important elements of a knowledge-based 
economy’ and that  
 
the Secretary for Home Affairs, the Secretary for Commerce, Industry 
and Technology, and relevant bureaux and departments will work 
 together to devise a concrete plan and create the necessary favourable 
environment to promote and facilitate the development of these 
creative industries (Tung, 2003: 11). 
 
The key narrative strands in Hong Kong’s policy discourse are very similar to 
Singapore’s. First, creative industries are to facilitate the building of Asia’s world 
city, as Tung (2003: 7) established in his 2003 policy address. Second, creative 
industries are a trigger for economic development, for 
 
like other business activities, creative industries provide job 
opportunities, create wealth, produce consumer goods and services for 
local and overseas markets, enable growth in overall consumption… 
(HKADC, 2000: 2) 
 
At the same time, it is recognized that most companies in creative industries are small 
but export-oriented (or with a strong inclination towards exporting their services), so 
the discursive threads in HK Trade Development Council documents also focus on 
the need to develop measures that support export promotion (HKTDC Creative 
Industries Report, Sep 2002). Third, as with Singapore, Hong Kong policy documents 
acknowledge how creative industries enhance the city as a place for quality living, 
thus promoting tourism and attracting investment (HKADC, 2000: 6). Fourth, in 
parallel again with Singapore’s stance, artistic creation is viewed as ‘a cohesive agent 
in building community identity’, ‘allow[ing] local citizens as well as visitors a deeper 
understanding of the Hong Kong spirit’ (HKADC, 2000: 6). Finally, a minor strand of 
the Hong Kong narrative acknowledges the possibility of ‘export[ing] cultural 
influence’ (HKADC 2000: 2) and ‘promot[ing] mutual understanding between people 
and countries’ (HKADC 2000: 6), a thread more reminiscent of China’s attention to 
international cultural exchange and Japan’s penchant for Joseph Nye’s concept of 
‘soft power’ (see later discussion) than Singapore’s economic and social discourse. 
 
Another way in which Hong Kong policy documents differ from Singapore’s is that 
Hong Kong policy documents do not make reference to circulating discourses and 
key authors, though they are informed by them, to the extent that research 
commissioned by the Hong Kong government that has been produced in the last few 
 years by Hong Kong University’s Cultural Policy Research Unit has shown a clear 
knowledge and understanding of circulating discourses, including the works of 
Florida, Howkins and others.  In the policy documents, however, the citations are of 
examples of other countries, particularly the UK, and to an extent, Australia and New 
Zealand. The British example is especially used to justify the need to develop a 
creative economy. Something should be said here about the historical and political 
economy context of this tendency to defer to the UK, an outcome of colonial rule for 
150 years, and the ties that have developed consequently, for example, through years 
of British investment in Hong Kong. For example, HK Arts Development Council’s 
first introductory paper on creative industry in 2000 uses UK as a case study to 
extract implementation strategies for Hong Kong. It draws from the UK Task force on 
creative industries’ mapping document (1998) rather extensively.  Following this, the 
HK Trade Development Council’s piece on ‘Creative Industries in HK’ in 2002 
makes reference to and compares creative industries in UK, Australia and New 
Zealand, to the fledgling one in HK, to justify the need for development of HK’s 
creative sector. 
 
Hong Kong’s business community is also active in urging the development of 
creative industries. For example, like the government departments’ penchant to look 
towards the UK, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce also urged the 
government to consider the former colonial government’s ‘Creative Business 
Network’ (2003) as the model of public sector/ business sector involvement to 
spearhead the creative economy development in Hong Kong (HKGCC, 2003: 1). 
 
Overall, there is much in common between Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s emphasis 
on the creative economy, and many similarities in the discursive threads.  Both are 
also engaged in detailed study of the experience of other countries and display a 
willingness to learn from other successes. Singapore displays somewhat more 
engagement with specific concepts (e.g. creative cluster, creative manpower) in the 
globalizing discourse than Hong Kong does though of late, Hong Kong has also 
embarked on an effort to measure Hong Kong’s creativity index, adapted from 
Florida’s conception. In general, this may reflect the greater degree of planning in 
Singapore, in contrast to the Hong Kong government’s less directed and more 
 facilitative role, in which an ‘open industrial alliance’ is advocated (HKADC 2000: 
6). 
 
South Korea 
 
South Korea and Taiwan provide further evidence of international diffusion of 
discourses, with the ‘creative’ and ‘cultural’ industries appearing in numerous policy 
documents, though again without as many of the related concepts as is apparent in 
Singapore.  There is, however, no less enthusiasm for the potential of the creative 
economy. Like Hong Kong and Singapore, South Korea picked up the normative 
discourses particularly in the late 1990s, where Culture and Tourism Minister Park 
Jie-won announced in 1999 that culture was a ‘key strategic industry in the 
knowledge-based society of the future’ (The Korea Herald, 28 Sept 1999). 
Creative/cultural industries such as film and broadcasting were deemed to be 
economically more competitive than manufacturing. He expressed the government’s 
commitment to expanding the infrastructure of cultural activities and nurturing 
cultural manpower, in basic art disciplines as well as culture-related industries (The 
Korea Herald, 17 Sept 1999).   
 
Indeed, the term ‘cultural industry’ was given official recognition as early as 1999 
when the Cultural Industry Promotion Act was established. This Act defines cultural 
industry as being ‘industry related to the production, distribution and consumption of 
cultural products, which tend to create economic value’ (HakSoon, 2005). According 
to the Act, the scope of Korea’s cultural industry includes film, music, video, games, 
publishing and printing, broadcasting, advertising, design, crafts, character, fine arts, 
animation, performing industry, and digital contents etc. With this legislation came 
the establishment of a five-year plan for the Korean cultural content industry, 
including Content Korea Vision 21 (2000) and Creative Korea Vision (2004), as well 
as the establishment of public organizations, namely the Korea Culture and Content 
Agency (2001).  KOCCA is currently affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism. Since the 1999 Act, various policy documents and statements emphasizing 
the economic potential of culture have been produced from three ministries: Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Culture and Tourism, and Commerce, Industry and Energy. This is 
a contrast to the emphasis in the 1970s on preservation of cultural heritage in cultural 
 policy and in the 1980s on the promotion of arts and cultural activities for the 
population to enjoy (Kim and Yoo, 2002: 82). While discursive elements related to 
creativity and/or culture as central to national identity/histories persist, today they do 
not dominate over the argument of economic importance. In fact, South Korea, like 
Taiwan, as we will see later, has developed its own concept, ‘cultural content 
industries’, to refer to ‘a kind of ‘cultural product’ that is produced by cultural factors 
such as heritage, a people’s way of life, ideas, values and folklore’ (KOCCA, 2005). 
 
It is important to note here the ‘Korean Wave’ which refers to the influx and soaring 
popularity of South Korean popular culture in other Asian countries.  This transfer 
and consumption of culture within Asia painted a clear picture of the economic value 
associated with creative industries, resulting in the establishment of organisations 
such as KOCCA, which formed in 2001, the same year the term ‘Korean Wave’ was 
coined in China.  It is important to consider, however, that the success of the Korean 
Wave was not due to organisations such as KOCCA but rather the ‘adaptability’ of 
South Korean culture to other Asian cultures, namely Chinese.  A graduate student at 
Peking University was quoted as saying, “We like American culture, but we can’t 
accept it directly”. (New York Times, January 10, 2006) Similarly, another student 
stated, “And there is no obstacle to our accepting South Korean culture, unlike 
Japanese culture………Because of the history between China and Japan, if a young 
person here likes Japanese culture, the parents will get angry”. (New York Times, 
January 10, 2006)  This suggests then, that the success of Korea’s creative industries 
are not necessarily immediately related to policy, but rather regional history. 
 
Unlike Singapore, South Korean national policy documents make no reference to the 
key authors in creative/cultural industry discourse, which may suggest (albeit 
inconclusively) that the normative ideas came to South Korea via a different 
circulation. One possible link is South Korea’s involvement with UNESCO through 
the Asia-Pacific Regional Centre of the Culturelink Network (APRCCN), a part of 
the Korean National Commission for UNESCO. Information provided by the 
APRCCN is not reflective of popular academic discourse, despite providing a 
definition of cultural industry. 
 
Taiwan 
  
In Taiwan, government documents mapping strategies for the creative industries seem 
a little later in the making, starting some two years after the other three ‘tigers’, in 
2002. Indeed, the major document, the Cultural Policy White Paper, was produced as 
recently as 2004. Despite the relative recency, Taiwan’s attention to the development 
of this area is no less serious than in Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, and 
indeed, is at least as energetically pursued. Clearly, Taiwan is coming to terms with 
its bubble and now bursting economy centred on manufacturing. As a means of 
preventing a collapse of the economy and in the desire to create another ‘Taiwan 
miracle’, the government has taken on a comprehensive campaign that envisions 
cultural/creative industries as a trigger to the next national economic boom.  The six-
year national development plan initiated in 2002, named ‘Challenge 2008’, noted that 
‘the value-added model of the knowledge-based economy should be the core of 
innovative design in production, especially artistic and esthetic creation, which has 
been ignored during the past’ (Challenge 2008, 2002: 2). Specifically, the Cultural 
Policy White Paper created by the Council for Cultural Affairs adopted the strategy of 
cultural and creative industries, understood using British Government and UN 
definitions. In addition, Taiwan has coined its own terms: ‘cultural creative 
industries’ and ‘creative living’ to reflect its aspirations.  The use of ‘cultural 
creativity’ may represent an effort to distinguish the new initiatives from the older 
‘cultural protection’, in which Taiwan had in some way viewed itself as the only 
place in which Chinese culture was being preserved following the Cultural 
Revolution in mainland China. This may have also been further perpetuated by 
Chiang Kai-shek's decision to remove many valuable cultural relics from mainland 
during his exile to Taiwan; in a way saving them from the Communists.  This new 
‘cultural creativity’, however, focuses on quite different cultural resources, and the 
specific sectors that the government has chosen to develop are identified in Table 2.  
 
While the narrative about creativity and culture triggering economic development 
dominates Taiwanese policy discourse, one exception deserves attention. Taiwan’s 
drive to embrace cultural/creative industries is so strong that opposing groups are 
voicing concerns about the potential loss of national cultural identity in exchange for 
profit (http://www.barcelona2004.org/esp/banco_del_ 
conocimiento/docs/PO_22_EN_SHIU.pdf). This is evidence of the extent to which 
 the normative discourse has dominated government agendas, that alternative voices 
have found the need to issue a reminder of the other roles of culture and creativity. 
 
While the standard authors such as Florida, Landry et al. are nowhere to be seen in 
the literature, Taiwan has directly adopted concepts from the British Cultural and 
Creative Industry Team and the UN Commission on creative industries, and after 
translation, widely distributed Australia’s Creative Nation report. Indeed, like the 
other ‘tigers’, and reminiscent of post World War II Japan, Taiwanese official 
discourse is deeply built on information on European countries, particularly the UK, 
drawn from serious detailed research. Like the other ‘tigers’, Taiwan also sent a 
group of officials around Europe (Denmark, France and England) to observe culture 
and creativity in order to structure Taiwan in a similarly successful fashion. Thus, 
despite the absence of key Western authors, Taiwan has not avoided the opportunity 
to draw directly upon existing work and structures of other countries. 
 
Geographies of circulation and adaptation 
 
The four ‘tigers’ share some similar circumstances and goals (such as the desires to 
establish ‘world city’ status and to transcend a reliance on manufacturing), and have 
been attracted to creative economy discourse in much the same ways. All four have 
emphasised common narratives of place competition in the global economy, ‘new’ 
economic growth and export potential, and the commercial contributions of creativity 
and the arts. Evidence exists that they also compete with, and borrow from, each 
other. Singapore aspires to rival Hong Kong, and Taiwan has adapted concepts from 
other earlier Asian innovators. Yet even within this group of countries, the stories of 
creative economy are augmented with local variations, some wedded to already-
existing cultural discourses (like nation-building in Singapore), while elements of the 
Euro-American normative script are ignored or downplayed (like discussions of 
creative clusters within cities) or resisted, as in Taiwan. In other Asian contexts, such 
as Japan, the divergences become even more pronounced. 
 
DIVERGENT DISCOURSES: JAPAN’S DILEMMA 
 
 In contrast to the travelling discourses impacting Asian ‘tiger’ territories, the 
experience of Japan, China and India all tell different stories of partial diffusion, 
adaptation, and silences. Of all the Asian economies discussed in this paper, Japan’s 
economy perhaps needs the most resuscitation. Yet, Japan’s national cultural policy 
least emphasises the economic potential of culture, focusing instead on culture and 
the arts as social assets to nation-building and personal fulfilment, and as a resource 
for international leadership (offering ‘soft power’) and enhancing foreign relations 
through international exchange (as opposed to international trade). Interestingly, in 
contrast to government, economic organizations and business lobby groups in Japan 
have recognized the potential of ‘creative industries’, ‘creative economy’ and 
‘creative clusters’, and have argued for a similar recognition by the government when 
setting future policy for the country.   
 
The degree to which Japan has or has not adopted popular academic discourse 
associated with creative economy is immediately evident from results produced by 
general searches using appropriate terms. In Japanese, of the three sets of characters 
used, one set is used for words that are considered to be ‘foreign’ to the original 
Japanese language. Such words are becoming more and more common as young 
Japanese aspire to be cool by adopting English words into casual conversation. In the 
case of the term ‘creative industries’ there is an equivalent in Japanese: ‘kurieiteibu 
sangyou’ (クリエイティヴ産業), which is written by using the foreign characters 
for the word ‘creative’ and by using traditional Japanese characters for the word 
‘industries’. Despite the available translation of this term, searches utilising this 
particular translated format produces links, interestingly enough, to foreign sites, 
written in Japanese, such as The British Council Japan and the Queensland 
Government link for its display at the Expo 2005 in Japan. In both instances, creative 
industries seek to promote activities of those nations, rather than discuss creative 
industries as a part of Japan’s economy. The directly translated version of this term is 
not evidently used by the Japanese government. 
 
In order to uncover Japanese-based material on creative industries, it is necessary to 
search other terms such as chishiki keizai (知識経済) (knowledge-based economy).  
In doing so, reports from the OECD Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
 organizations such as universities or institutes of learning appear. These reports refer 
to the potential that creative industries can offer Japan’s economic future and the 
success or mandates in other parts of the world.   
 
National policy discourse in Japan tends to use the terms ‘culture’ and ‘the arts’ more 
frequently than ‘creative arts’. More significantly, the concept of ‘creative/cultural 
industry’ does not appear. In discussing culture and the arts, the emphasis is on 
personal, social and spiritual fulfilment, on their centrality to national identity and 
heritage, and latterly, on international relations. In 2004, statements from the Agency 
for Cultural Affairs, spelling out its use of budget, foreground these priorities 
explicitly: 
 
With the aim of building a fulfilling and healthy society by enhancing  
the ‘Power of Culture’, the main budget items consist of projects to 
promote nation-building based on culture and arts – which include 
support for programs to support Japan’s cinematic and media arts and 
other artistically or culturally creative activities; ensuring the 
transmission to future generations of cultural properties; promoting 
international exchange involving cultural properties; enhancing 
cultural hubs to promote culture and arts in local areas; and so forth 
(ACA, 2004a: 5). 
 
 
Pursing such an agenda, and in direct contrast to the Singaporean model, modern 
influences are constructed as threatening to local cultures – triggering conservative 
and somewhat nostalgic policy visions: 
 
Diverse forms of traditional culture that have been passed down in 
local areas are being threatened by extinction due to such social 
factors as depopulation, urbanization, the combined impact of a 
steeply dropping birth rate and an ageing population, and changes in 
lifestyles. It is crucial, therefore, to ensure that the succession and 
development of uniquely local forms of traditional culture so that they 
can be passed on to future generations (ACA, 2004c: 35). 
  
Even in the encouragement of new media, commonly associated with creative 
industries, the impetus is to ‘disseminat[e] and promot[e] culture’ and to 
‘invigorate[e] all of Japan’s arts and culture in the 21st century’ (ACA, 2004b: 22). As 
Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto (2003) of the NLI Research Institute wrote: 
 
…. the agency’s (Agency for Cultural Affairs) policies do not 
constitute an industrial policy, but are focused instead on support and 
subsidies for artistic activities in the private sector, operation of 
national cultural facilities, and promotion of cultural policies that are 
not commercially viable as industries in the market. 
 
It may be quite rightly argued that the Agency for Cultural Affairs does not have an 
economic remit, and thus, understandably, may not be the place to locate a circulating 
discourse about cultural and creative economies. Yet, turning our analysis to the 
discursive threads from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and 
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), it is evident that Japan's central 
government is yet to carry out formal research and furthermore, support the change 
from industrial to intellectual output. While there are some hints of governmental 
recognition of the potential of creative industries within METI and JETRO, they use 
different terminologies, in particular, the ‘service industry’ and ‘new value creation 
economy’. Further, in mentioning them, METI and JETRO merely acknowledge that 
not much has been done in Japan to mobilise these industries. For example, as recent 
a document as METI’s White Paper on International Economy and Trade (2004: 21) 
states: 
 
Although no comprehensive studies are currently being carried out in 
Japan concerning evaluation of intellectual assets, efforts are being 
made that will support comprehensive intellectual assets evaluation in 
future, such as examination and information disclosure and value 
evaluation methods for intellectual property, improvements in risk 
management capacity, and promotion of environmentally-friendly 
company management. 
 
 Similarly, in the 2003 White Paper on International Trade, there is acknowledgement 
of the growing importance of the ‘contents industry’ (2003:253), with reference made 
to developments in other Asian regions, and the potential for Japan: 
 
The development in the infrastructure of digital contents distribution in 
the Asian region, has given rise to expectation of significant 
expansions in business opportunities in the contents industry. The 
overseas development of the contents industry, in addition to 
increasing the added value of the Japanese contents industry, could 
contribute to increasing the competitiveness of Japanese industry as a 
whole and enhancing Japanese brand value by enhancing 
understanding of the diversity of Japanese culture. 
 
However, this acknowledgement has yet to be mirrored by policy directives. 
 
In contrast, the documents produced by economic organizations and commercial 
lobby groups contain stout arguments (going beyond simple acknowledgement) in 
favour of creativity and culture as an industry as well as being a part of social 
development. Dominant narratives such as ‘creativity as trigger for economic 
development’ and ‘creative industries contribute to international trade’ are at the core 
of arguments in favour of creative industries.  These groups, including for example 
the Marubeni Corporation’s Economic and Research Institute, and NLI Research, 
display a clear recognition that creative and cultural industries represent profit 
opportunities and that such industries are already successful overseas. They therefore 
argue that the government should better recognize the value of supporting such 
initiatives for the future of the Japanese economy. Further, these non-governmental 
groups’ positive disposition towards normative discourses is evidenced in their 
frequent references to authors such as McGray (2002), Howkins (2002), Zachary 
(2000),Venturelli (2001), Florida (2002), Shlain (1993) and Nye (2004).  
 
Overall, the language in national policy documents either ignores the cultural and 
creative industries, or acknowledges briefly (and recently) the growth of the ‘service’ 
and ‘contents’ industries, but it is apparent that organisations such as METI and 
JETRO as well as the business groups are still in the stage of trying to lobby the 
 central government of the value of these sectors. It remains clear that there is no 
national agenda to dive into these concepts, certainly not anything similar to the 
Asian ‘tigers’. 
 
Somewhat ironically, while the divergent discourses persist, Japan’s creative and 
cultural industries have already achieved international influence – anime, Hello Kitty, 
manga, J-pop and so forth – and it is clear that, even without a specific national 
creative industry policy, Japanese cultural products have international circulation. As 
McGray (2002: np) highlights: 
Director and actor Takeshi Kitano, arguably the Japanese film industry’s 
most noteworthy recent export, was first embraced in Europe, then in the 
United States. At this year’s Berlin Film Festival, Hayao Miyazaki’s 
Spirited Away became the first animation feature ever to win a top 
festival prize. A major publishing show in Frankfurt, for the first time, 
opened an exhibition of Japanese manga. Namie Amuro, reigning “J-
Pop” (Japan-Pop) music diva of the 1990s, built a huge fan base in Asia 
without ever going on tour in the United States. Millions of teenagers in 
Hong Kong, Seoul, and Bangkok covet the latest fashions from Tokyo 
…. Japanese lifestyle magazines, some of the most lavishly produced in 
the world, are smuggled by illegal distributors across Asia as soon as 
they are on newsstands in Tokyo … 
Further to this, when former Korean president Kim Dae-Jung visited Osaka, Japan in 
1998, he paid homage to the development of cultural products in the Kansai Region 
of Japan, in ways that also reflect that country’s consciousness of the contribution of 
creative industries: ‘I am especially happy to be here in Kansai because this region is 
practicing what I have been preaching – that is that the economy in the coming 
century will evolve into one led by information and culture industries’ (Dae-Jung, 
1998). Though there are municipal-level policies to encourage sectoral developments 
(e.g. fashion design in Kobe) the silence at national policy level and the absence of a 
coordinated approach remains. 
 
 Various reasons might be ventured as to why the internationalizing discourse has not 
convinced Japan’s national policy makers in the same way that it has enthused 
economic organizations and business lobby groups there; and why the creative and 
cultural industries gained ascendancy in Japan despite the absence of national policy2. 
First, postwar Japan has strongly juxtaposed ‘culture’ and ‘economics’.  ‘Culture’ is a 
palliative for overworked, overstressed industrial/ business warriors. ‘Traditional’ 
culture is viewed as soothing to the trauma inflicted by industrial modernity. An 
unchanging ‘national culture’ is invoked as a constant that can ameliorate the 
disorientating effects of that country’s recent problems: 
 
As society undergoes abrupt and extensive changes in industry, 
employment, science and technology, and many other fields, a greater 
share of the Japanese population is seeking a sense of spiritual 
fulfilment. Culture, which bestows people with a sense of composure 
and satisfaction, surely plays an essential role in enabling people to 
experience genuine fulfilment (ACA, 2004b:22).  
 
At the same time, ‘traditional culture’ has been deployed to counter the image of 
Japanese people as unidimensional economic creatures. These factors may explain 
why ACA’s policies are not about ‘culture as economy’. Second, given Japan’s 
imperialistic history in Asia, any hint of Japanese ‘economic imperialism’ or ‘cultural 
imperialism’ will not be well-received. This is particularly true as it pertains to Korea 
and China.  To adopt aggressive normative discourses about cultural industries and to 
officially proclaim and fuel the domination of J-pop and other exported cultural 
products in Asia from a national stage might appear to be an unwarranted act of 
aggression.  Business groups and non-governmental organisations do not face the 
same constraints as the national government. 
 
Given that Japan’s industrial development has traditionally been government-led, one 
might well ask why some creative industries have thrived despite the absence of 
national policy. McGray (2002) offered one perspective on why Japan’s recent 
recessionary conditions may have boosted the creativity of the workforce: 
                                                 
 
  
Perversely, recession may have boosted Japan’s national cool, 
discrediting Japan’s rigid social hierarchy and empowering young 
entrepreneurs. It may also have loosened the grip a big-business career 
track had over so much of Japan’s workforce, who now face fewer 
social stigmas for experimenting with art, music, or any number of 
similar, risky endeavors. ‘There’s a new creativeness here because 
there’s less money,’ said Tokyo-based architect Mark Dytham, a 
London transplant. ‘Good art is appearing, young strong art. Young 
fashion is appearing’.  
This, he argues, is reinforced by the fact that Tokyo’s one-child families have 
conferred on the younger generation a tremendous consumer power which is 
propelling a range of industries, from fashion to music to cell phones (McGray, 2002).  
It is also important to consider non-profit organisations such as Hoso-Bunka (The 
Foundation for Broadcast Culture).  Though the foundation “aims to promote the 
cultural and technological development of broadcasting and progress of radio, 
television and other telecommunications media” (HBF, 2006) and co-operates with 
the International Institute of Communications, it is not the sole body through which 
Japanese creative industries are promoted.  For example, outside of broadcasting, 
media and telecommunications, there is a vast array of creative industries.  With 
noteworthy Japanese successes in fashion and film, for example, it is necessary to 
realise that the exposure and success of these projects to date, have not been reliant on, 
or due to Japanese government policy or the influence of Japanese organisations.  
Rather, the industries are successful due to the efforts and quality of the individual 
projects; not because of the promotional interventions of an intermediary body.   
The Japanese story then, with its divergences and complexity, demonstrates how non-
adoption of ideas does not simply equate with a ‘lack’ stemming from ignorance, but 
instead, emphasizes the importance of context, history and economic and political 
geography in explanations of the diffusion of new ideas, and adoption/non-adoption 
in official policy. 
ABSENT DISCOURSE: UNPLANNED CREATIVITY IN INDIA 
  
Unlike Japan’s ailing economy, China’s and India’s economies have been hailed as 
holding great promise. Like Japan, India does not have the same aggressive 
creative/cultural industry policy that the Asian ‘tigers’ have. Indeed, despite the 
success of Bollywood and the software and digital media industry, there is an absence 
of an explicit and coordinated national policy for ‘creative’ and ‘cultural industry’.  
These terms are simply not apparent in policy discourse. What exists instead are 
‘standalone’ regulations for different sectors which in effect constitute part of a 
creative economy, which are thriving, and which hold ever greater promise. As Assaf 
(2005: 4) projects: 
 
According to current projections the Indian entertainment industry is 
expected to double in size in the next five years from the current level 
of US$4.3 billion to US$9.4 billion in 2008. Similarly, the software 
industry is expected to increase three-fold from the current levels of 
around US$20 billion to US$67.5 billion in 2008. The Indian 
animation industry is expected to grow to US$1.5 billion in 2005. 
 
Like Japan, the policy discourses in India are focused on culture as integral to 
national identity. This is reflected in India’s cultural policy which outlines three 
objectives: to preserve the cultural heritage; to inculcate art consciousness among the 
people; and to promote high standards in the performing and creative arts (Embassy 
of India 2005). The Ministry of Culture’s mission statement further reflects the non-
economic stance adopted by the government: 
 
The mission of the department is to preserve, promote and disseminate 
all forms of art and culture. In order to achieve this, the department 
undertakes the following activities:  
 Maintenance and conservation of heritage, historic sites and 
ancient monuments  
 Promotion of literary, visual and performing arts  
 Administration of libraries   
 Observation of centenaries and anniversaries of important 
national personalities and events  
  Promotion of institutions and organisations of Buddhist and 
Tibetan studies  
 Promotion of institutional and individual non-official initiatives 
in the fields of art and culture  
 Entering into cultural agreements with foreign countries.   
The functional spectrum of the Department ranges from creating 
cultural awareness from the grassroots level to the international 
cultural exchange level (Ministry of Culture, Government of India, 
2003-2004).  
 
Nonetheless, hints of a travelling discourse emerged in the latest (10th) 5-yr plan 
(2002-2007), indicating an awakening to the potential to be harnessed, and the need 
for policy to facilitate greater economization of culture in the coming years: 
 
In the present day world, culture is not confined to merely being a 
manifestation of the urge for self-expression by individuals and 
communities but is also a vehicle for providing employment 
opportunities. With a large number of people dependent on the output 
of this sector, promotion of this sector is necessary to spur economic 
growth, apart from strengthening its role as an expression of the 
creative urges of the people. (India’s 10th 5-yr plan, 2002: 279). 
 
Despite this acknowledgement, translation into operational measures is not yet 
evident in public policy. Indeed, the ‘thrust areas’ identified by the Prime Minister’s 
Office for policy implementation in 2005 for the various Ministries and Departments 
are also notably silent on the development of India’s culture economy or creative 
industries. The focus of the Ministry of Commerce, for instance, is on the SEZ 
(Special Economic Zones) and Competitive Economic Zone policy, while the focus 
areas for the Ministry of Culture are on development and implementation of policies 
on heritage sites/monuments, archaeological surveys and archival material (Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2005). 
 
In February 2005, UNESCO hosted a symposium in Jodhpur, India, on creative 
industries and how they could help the development process. There was no 
 representation by Indian government officials at the symposium. This prompted the 
Financial Express (26/2/05) to lament the notable absence of ‘key players who 
needed to hear the debate to enable them to go back, comprehend the global, national 
and regional issues and varying positions and views to convert the relevant ideas into 
policy for the many diverse areas in India’.  
 
Like Japan, the question that might be asked about India is why the travelling 
discourse is absent, despite the presence of thriving creative industries.  Unlike Japan, 
perhaps this is linked to the presence of other, more pressing national priorities: to 
overcome poverty, obtain food security, deal with internal conflicts and tensions.  
Potentially, a creative economy strategy is somewhat of a luxury, only vigorously 
pursued by wealthier countries (both within Asia, and elsewhere). 
 
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF WESTERN NORMATIVE DISCOURSE: 
CREATIVITY IN SOCIALIST CHINA?  
 
China offers an interesting case for analysis as a socialist country transitioning into 
capitalism, unlike the rest of the cases examined here. Our discussion benefits much 
from insights by Wang (2003, 2004) who asked some similar questions about the 
specific discursive constructs in China taking into account its particular 
socioeconomic circumstances. 
 
An analysis of the national policy documents suggests that China is not shy of using 
the term wenhua chanye (文化产业 cultural industries).  The acknowledgement of the 
value of cultural industries represents a move from its earlier industrial model in 
which cultural goods are ‘standardised goods… distributed to an imagined national 
community’ (Keane, 2004:267). The term ‘cultural industries’ appeared in 1995 when 
the Chinese Government officially declared cultural industries to be part of national 
development (Keane, 2004: 268). This was followed up in 1998 when the Ministry of 
Culture formally instituted a Cultural Industries Department, and again in 2001 when 
the Tenth Five Year Plan confirmed the role of wenhua chanye. These appearances of 
‘cultural industries’ in policy discourse must be situated within the Ministry of 
Culture’s broader approach to the cultural sector, which may be categorised as a 
 three-pronged one, focused on enhancing the cultural product itself; on the 
infrastructures (physical, legal, fiscal) to support the production and protection of 
cultural goods; and on international cultural relations.   
 
The first approach is translated into policies directed towards improving the quality of 
the arts and cultural works (for example, through a nationwide programme of ‘Works 
of Excellence for the Stage’ to boost the production of quality theatrical works around 
the country).  The second approach covers a large area, and entails: 
 
• enhancing grassroots cultural infrastructure so that community cultural activities 
gain momentum 
• building a sound cultural market system and creating a good market environment 
for cultural development, including developing a system to contain piracy, 
smuggling and pornography 
• actively promoting cultural industries via the setting up of a Department of 
Cultural Industries to outline the roadmap and strategy, the formulation of 
development plans by all local authorities, the restructuring of state-owned 
cultural enterprises, widening of market access to foreign investments in the 
management of cultural and entertainment programs as well as the construction, 
renovation and management of cultural venues, and the encouragement of 
domestic capital, particularly private capital, to enter the cultural market 
• strengthening protection of cultural heritage through documenting key heritage 
sites, promulgating appropriate laws on the protection of cultural relics and folk 
and traditional culture; and  
• investing in the production and maintenance of cultural infrastructure (e.g. grand 
theatres, museums and libraries).   
 
The third involves encouraging international cultural exchange, effectively a foreign 
relations policy.  
 
In referencing wenhua chanye, China draws a distinction with wenhua shiye (文化事
业), the former reflecting a willingness to establish commercial cultural enterprises 
dealing with ‘commercializable’ products (有营利性), and the latter cordoned off as 
 ‘public cultural institutions’, dealing with a non-commercializable sector (Wang, 
2003: 7). As Wang (2003: 7) elaborates, commercializable products are ‘considered 
less sensitive to national culture and information security’, and include ‘performance, 
tourism, industrial and cultural exhibitions, technical production and distribution of 
audiovisual products, sports and entertainment, higher education and professional 
education’. Indeed, the policy is to have existing national capital ‘exit gradually by 
means of asset sales and transfers, mergers, close-downs, and bankruptcy’ while 
encouraging domestic and foreign capital to enter the market (Wang, 2003: 8). At the 
other end of the spectrum are the highly regulated state-owned monopoly danwei (单
位), including the non-commercializable sector comprising libraries, museums, 
institutions responsible for the preservation of national cultural artefacts, and 
compulsory education (Wang, 2003: 8). These are deemed significant for cultural 
identity formation and information security. Additionally, reference is also 
occasionally made to the idea of shi ye ji tuan qi ye guan li (事业集团企业管理), that 
is, the appearance of a public institution which functions like a commercial enterprise.  
This reflects a transitioning China, with a rapid re-drawing of boundaries between 
public and private, commerce and culture. 
 
The discursive and practical distinctions described above are a reflection of the local 
social, economic and political geography. The adopted distinctions contrast China 
with countries like the U.S. which pursue the logic of free trade and open markets, 
even in the context of cultural goods. Interestingly, though, China is not alone in not 
subscribing fully to the idea of free markets and free trade in cultural products. 
Canada and EU countries, despite being at quite a different end of the ideological and 
economic developmental spectrum from China, do not support free trade rules in 
relation to cultural and media products either (Wang, 2003: 12). This is because they 
seek to protect their national culture from the homogenizing influences of American 
cultural products, and desire to make space for the creative content of their national 
cultures. On the other hand, for China, Wang (2004: 13) argues, the ‘western concept 
of creative freedom’ is inappropriate, given state surveillance that curtails what Keane 
(2003: 2) calls ‘unfiltered, market-led content’. Thus, the persistence of a non-
commercializable sector is directed at ensuring that not all creative content becomes 
rampant and unfettered.  This would explain what Cunningham et al. (2005: 6) 
 identify to be the intractable regulatory system that oversees particular creative 
industries sectors. Ironically, it is also the weakness of surveillance in another sense, 
that of limitations in policing IPR violations, that product innovation is stifled and 
imitation favoured over creative innovation (Cunningham et al., 2005: 6).3  Another 
possible reason for the distinctions between wenhua chanye and wenhua shiye, and 
the absence of chuangyi chanye in official discourse, stems from socialist thought. 
Specifically, the longstanding Marxist leadership’s view of cultural output as 
superstructural and intangible, reflecting economic reality rather than a pure 
economic commodity, left little role and recognition for the creator (Keane, 2004: 
16).  Thus, it is no surprise that the supposedly global reach of normative discourses 
is inflected by the specific locales and milieux of China. 
 
At this juncture, China appears to lag behind its Asian counterparts (like Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Korea) in its attempts to position itself in the global creative 
economy.  It continues to battle ills of capital funding, administrative red tape, a weak 
regulatory IPR environment and flagrant piracy. Further, given China’s historical and 
cultural legacies, the concept of ‘creativity’ remains an unfamiliar one.  However, 
variations within a very vast country are beginning to emerge.  In 2005, Shanghai 
started identifying ‘creative industry clusters’, and has 18 in total now.  Beijing, on 
the other hand, continues with the notion of ‘cultural creative industries’.  Variations 
notwithstanding, overall, China’s national policy discourse has lately come to 
recognize the economic value of the ‘cultural industries, though importantly, the 
socialist backdrop renders the ‘western’ discourse subject to much modification, or 
simply inapplicable. Indeed, as with Singapore, besides the economic bent, China’s 
policy discourse remains cognizant of the cultural needs at the community level, with 
efforts to improve the cultural life of urban and rural folk through the construction of 
cultural centres, libraries, and the protection of traditional folk art/culture.   
 
Conclusions 
 
                                                 
3 The recent “White Paper on IPR Protection” (published in April 2005) signals the government’s 
intent to bring the IPR issue under control and restore business confidence. This represents another 
step in China’s transition to capitalism. 
 
 This paper traced an uneven geography of flows of creative economy discourses. The 
extent and type of engagements with internationalizing discourses of creative 
economy vary enormously from country to country, and in the case of Japan, between 
the government and commercial forces within the nation. Instead of charting a literal 
spatial diffusion of creative economy ideas, we have instead sought to read the broad 
contours of a relational geography of information flow and policy formulation. Rather 
than map a chronology of policy development from one place to another, we have 
sought to show how ideas have travelled through networks of government agencies, 
chambers of commerce, arts policy-makers and export promoters in complex ways. 
This paper anticipates ethnographic research that could further flesh out the 
embedded and embodied processes through which new ideas are received and 
considered, mutated or adopted, or simply jettisoned. This approach understands that 
distance, and other ‘traditional’ barriers such as language still matter, despite the 
advances in ICT. Geography does indeed play an important role in explaining the 
uneven terrain of flow and uptake of ideas about creative economies throughout Asia. 
Further, we have sought to show how ideas have flowed, been received and adapted 
(with varying enthusiasm) in intermittent, sometimes incoherent or contradictory 
ways, emphasising especially the role of national socio-economic and political 
circumstances. 
 
In the case of Singapore, adoption of discourses was early, if tentative, and then 
followed by a more substantive phase. But even in its latter phase of more deep 
absorption of creative economy discourse into national economic development policy, 
Singapore tended to use key theorists like Richard Florida as little more than ‘expert 
citations’. Reference to Euro-American experts legitimised creative economy 
strategies rather than informing them in heavily conceptual ways (cf. Gibson and 
Klocker, 2004). In other places – like Taiwan and South Korea – creative economy 
discourses have been rather eagerly embraced, yet without reference to the key 
authors of those ideas, or the detail of their theoretical constructs. At the same time, 
competitive relations within the region have unsettled linear presumptions of ‘source 
of origin’ and ‘receiving’ locations: some Asian countries have borrowed from each 
other, or generated creative economy policies so as to avert falling behind regional 
counterparts (as in Singapore and Hong Kong). Here, the push to adopt normative 
 western concepts was likely to be subordinate to the desire to remain ahead of nearby 
countries in a ‘race’ to global status and success. 
 
There are numerous ways of interpreting this uneven, contradictory and partial 
geography of information flow and adaptation in relation to our original aims. On the 
one hand, the rather surface application of overseas expert knowledges in places like 
Singapore highlights an uncritical appraisal of imported ideas, and possibly an 
inappropriate application of such knowledges in local circumstances. In parallel to 
this, Taiwan and South Korea’s engagements with creative economy discourse (and 
silence on the role of western ‘experts’) could be seen as a case of convenient cultural 
borrowing of terms like creative and cultural industries, linked to observed successes 
in pan-Asian markets for entertainment, without any depth of intellectual exchange. 
But on the other hand, Singapore’s surface adaptation of western concepts also means 
that the influence of particular foreign experts is minimised. Their theories do not 
deeply penetrate policy formulation, and though cited, are instead swamped within 
the more torrential flows of people and ideas traveling to Singapore, and mixing 
there, from Europe, Australasia, North America and the rest of Asia. 
 
Discourses of creative economies in Asia are also as much defined by how they do 
not engage with western concepts and ideas, as by the extent to which they do. In 
some cases, there were simply silences on whole aspects of western policy discourse 
(as in India); or alternative emphases that either hybridized new ‘commercial’ 
interpretations of creativity with older, social and community development goals 
(Singapore, China); or scorned commercialism and modernity and instead, promoted 
‘traditional’ culture as a sphere of cultural expression providing relief and retreat for 
increasingly urban, professional classes (Japan). In all cases, creative economy 
policies could not be understood intellectually – nor divorced practically – from 
domestic and regional political circumstances. The absence of export-orientation in 
Japanese creative industry policies owes much to its post-war legacy, and the 
sensitivities surrounding the influence of Japanese culture in the region, while 
China’s transition from socialist to capitalist state was evident in the emphases and 
tenor of its strategies. Rather than construct simplistic geographies of diffusion of 
creative economy discourses – where Asia is seen as marginal to other, more central 
places of origin (a conclusion that could be made by purely looking at the geography 
 of academic effort on the topic), we have hoped to demonstrate how knowledges flow 
and are mutated in complex and multi-scaled ways – simultaneously transforming 
local, metropolitan, national and regional discourses, and being transformed in those 
contexts. Although there is much in the ‘normative’ script of creative economy 
worthy of critique (see Gibson and Kong 2005), it is clear that in Asia, the normative 
script has only partially diffused (in some places more than others), often augmenting, 
but rarely overwhelming, local goals and desires. 
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 Table 1: Key Creative economy ideas in selected Asian countries 
Singapore Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan Japan China India 
An abundance of related 
concepts pepper a number of 
policy documents, including 
creative industries/creative 
economy/creative cluster, 
cultural industries, creative 
town concept, cultural 
capital, creative people, 
creative workforce, 
connected nation, copyright 
industries.  Clear and careful 
distinctions between 
creative/cultural/copyright 
industries/economy.  Earliest 
mentions of economic 
potential of culture emerged 
as far back as the early 
1990s, though concentrated 
attention appears to have 
emerged with a 2000 
Renaissance City report and 
thereafter. 
Creative industries 
are identified as a 
key thrust in Hong 
Kong’s economic 
reform, as they 
build innovative 
capability.  First 
acknowledgement 
by Chief Executive 
as early as 1998, 
followed by a slew 
of government and 
commissioned 
reports in the early 
2000s.  Notion of 
‘creativity index’ 
has been adopted 
and is being 
studied. 
Significant 
appearance of 
ideas like ‘creative 
industries’ and 
‘cultural 
industries’, as well 
as ‘cultural 
content 
industries’.  The 
term ‘cultural 
industry’ utilized 
as early as 1999 
when the ‘Cultural 
Industry 
Promotion Act’ 
was established.   
Even more use of 
ideas like ‘cultural 
industries’ and 
‘creative industries’ 
than South Korea.  
Taiwan has coined its 
own term ‘cultural 
creative industries’ 
by combining both.  
Has proposed new 
concepts of industry 
sectors like ‘creative 
living’.  A key policy 
paper is the Cultural 
Policy White Paper 
of 2004, authored by 
the Council for 
Cultural Affairs. 
The idea of cultural 
industry/economy 
and creative 
industry/economy is 
not much evident in 
policy documents.  
The term ‘creative 
industries’ does 
have a Japanese 
equivalent (ku-
rieteibu sangyou) 
but there is not 
much material on it 
in government 
discourse.  The most 
dominant terms in 
government 
documents are 
‘culture’, ‘culture 
and arts’ and 
creative/cultural 
activites’.  
Documents by 
economic 
organizations and 
lobby groups try to 
make a case for 
‘creative industries’, 
‘creative economy’ 
and ‘creative 
clusters’. 
A 1995 15-
year 
initiative 
where 
cultural 
industries 
was declared 
as part of 
national 
development.  
In, 1998 
establishment 
of Cultural 
Industries 
Department 
in the 
Ministry of 
Culture.  
2001 10th 
Five-Year 
Plan 
mentioned 
wenhua 
chanye 
(cultural 
industries) 
for the first 
time since 
the reform 
era.  
Distinction 
between 
Absence of 
explicit and 
coordinated 
‘creative 
industry’ 
and 
‘cultural 
industry’ 
national 
policy. 
 Singapore Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan Japan China India 
public 
cultural 
institutions 
(wenhua 
shiye) and 
commercial 
cultural 
enterprises 
(wenhua 
chanye). 
 
 Table 2: Key sectors of the creative economy in selected Asian countries 
Singapore Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan Japan China India 
Three key groups of creative 
industries identified in the 
2002 Economic Review 
Committee’s Creative 
Industries Development 
Strategy, viz: 
• arts and culture (including 
performing arts, visual arts, 
literary arts, photography, 
crafts, libraries, museums, 
galleries, archives, antiques, 
trade and crafts, 
impresarios, heritage sites, 
performing arts sites, 
festivals and arts supporting 
enterprises); 
• media (including 
broadcasting (radio, 
television and cable), film 
and video, publishing and 
printing, music recording, 
digital and IT-related 
content services); 
• design (including 
architectural services, 
advertising services and 
visual communications 
design, interior design, 
fashion design, graphics 
design, product and 
industrial design and so on) 
11 domains of 
creative industries: 
Advertising, 
architecture, art, 
antiques and crafts, 
design, digital 
entertainment, film 
and video, music, 
performing arts, 
publishing, 
software and 
computing, 
television and 
radio 
Korean Culture and 
Content Agency 
(KOCCA) defines 
Korea’s cultural 
industry in terms of 
film, music, video, 
games, publishing 
and printing, 
broadcasting, 
advertising, design, 
crafts, character, fine 
arts, animation, 
performing industry 
and digital content. 
The Council for 
Cultural Affairs 
identified 13 
sectors that 
make up 
cultural and 
creative 
industries: 
visual arts, 
music and 
performing arts, 
crafts, cultural 
display 
facilities, the 
design 
industries, 
publishing, TV 
and broadcast, 
movie, 
advertising, 
digital 
recreation and 
entertainment, 
designer 
fashion 
industry, 
architectural 
design industry, 
and lifestyle 
industry. 
Traditional arts, dance 
and music, theatres, 
museums, historic 
properties, artists are 
frequently identified.  
Economic/lobby 
groups identify music, 
film, television, 
publishing, design, 
computer games and 
advertising as worthy 
of development and 
support.   
Includes film, 
television, audiovisual 
products, publishing, 
performing arts, visual 
art, sport, and 
education.  Excludes 
architecture, 
advertising, design, 
and heritage. 
Sectors such as 
performing arts, 
film, software and 
digital animation 
are all regulated 
and developed as 
‘standalone’ 
segments in India, 
rather than as part 
of coordinated and 
consolidated 
policy. 
 
